The Extended Mind by Clark, Andy & Chalmer, Dave
 
"The Extended Mind" (with Dave Chalmers) ANALYSIS 58: 1: 1998 p.7-19 
 Reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHER'S ANNUAL vol XXI-1998 (Ridgeview, 
2000) p.59-74 
 Reprinted in D. Chalmers (ed) PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:CLASSICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
 
The Extended Mind 
 
Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers [*] 
Department of Philosophy 
Washington University 
St. Louis, MO 63130 
 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Arizona 





*[[Authors are listed in order of degree of belief in the central thesis.]]  
 
[[Published in Analysis 58:10-23, 1998. Reprinted in (P. Grim, ed) The 





Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The 
question invites two standard replies. Some accept the 
demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the 
body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments 
suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", 
and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an 
externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We 
advocate a very different sort of externalism: an active externalism, 




2 Extended Cognition 
 
Consider three cases of human problem-solving:  
 
(1) A person sits in front of a computer screen which displays 
images of various two-dimensional geometric shapes and is asked 
to answer questions concerning the potential fit of such shapes into 
depicted "sockets". To assess fit, the person must mentally rotate 
the shapes to align them with the sockets.  
 
(2) A person sits in front of a similar computer screen, but this time 
can choose either to physically rotate the image on the screen, by 
pressing a rotate button, or to mentally rotate the image as before. 
We can also suppose, not unrealistically, that some speed 
advantage accrues to the physical rotation operation.  
 
(3) Sometime in the cyberpunk future, a person sits in front of a 
similar computer screen. This agent, however, has the benefit of a 
neural implant which can perform the rotation operation as fast as 
the computer in the previous example. The agent must still choose 
which internal resource to use (the implant or the good old 
fashioned mental rotation), as each resource makes different 
demands on attention and other concurrent brain activity.  
 
How much cognition is present in these cases? We suggest that all 
three cases are similar. Case (3) with the neural implant seems 
clearly to be on a par with case (1). And case (2) with the rotation 
button displays the same sort of computational structure as case 
(3), although it is distributed across agent and computer instead of 
internalized within the agent. If the rotation in case (3) is cognitive, 
by what right do we count case (2) as fundamentally different? We 
cannot simply point to the skin/skull boundary as justification, 
since the legitimacy of that boundary is precisely what is at issue. 
But nothing else seems different.  
 
The kind of case just described is by no means as exotic as it may 
at first appear. It is not just the presence of advanced external 
computing resources which raises the issue, but rather the general 
tendency of human reasoners to lean heavily on environmental 
supports. Thus consider the use of pen and paper to perform long 
multiplication (McClelland et al 1986, Clark 1989), the use of 
physical re-arrangements of letter tiles to prompt word recall in 
Scrabble (Kirsh 1995), the use of instruments such as the nautical 
slide rule (Hutchins 1995), and the general paraphernalia of 
language, books, diagrams, and culture. In all these cases the 
individual brain performs some operations, while others are 
delegated to manipulations of external media. Had our brains been 
different, this distribution of tasks would doubtless have varied.  
 
In fact, even the mental rotation cases described in scenarios (1) 
and (2) are real. The cases reflect options available to players of 
the computer game Tetris. In Tetris, falling geometric shapes must 
be rapidly directed into an appropriate slot in an emerging 
structure. A rotation button can be used. David Kirsh and Paul 
Maglio (1994) calculate that the physical rotation of a shape 
through 90 degrees takes about 100 milliseconds, plus about 200 
milliseconds to select the button. To achieve the same result by 
mental rotation takes about 1000 milliseconds. Kirsh and Maglio 
go on to present compelling evidence that physical rotation is used 
not just to position a shape ready to fit a slot, but often to help 
determine whether the shape and the slot are compatible. The latter 
use constitutes a case of what Kirsh and Maglio call an `epistemic 
action'. Epistemic actions alter the world so as to aid and augment 
cognitive processes such as recognition and search. Merely 
pragmatic actions, by contrast, alter the world because some 
physical change is desirable for its own sake (e.g., putting cement 
into a hole in a dam).  
 
Epistemic action, we suggest, demands spread of epistemic credit. 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that 
part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. 
Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head!  
 
 
3 Active Externalism 
 
In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external 
entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can 
be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the components 
in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we 
remove the external component the system's behavioral 
competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its 
brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally 
well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head.  
 
This externalism differs greatly from standard variety advocated by 
Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979). When I believe that water is wet 
and my twin believes that twin water is wet, the external features 
responsible for the difference in our beliefs are distal and 
historical, at the other end of a lengthy causal chain. Features of 
the present are not relevant: if I happen to be surrounded by XYZ 
right now (maybe I have teleported to Twin Earth), my beliefs still 
concern standard water, because of my history. In these cases, the 
relevant external features are passive. Because of their distal 
nature, they play no role in driving the cognitive process in the 
here-and-now. This is reflected by the fact that the actions 
performed by me and my twin are physically indistinguishable, 
despite our external differences.  
 
In the cases we describe, by contrast, the relevant external features 
are active, playing a crucial role in the here-and-now. Because they 
are coupled with the human organism, they have a direct impact on 
the organism and on its behavior. In these cases, the relevant parts 
of the world are in the loop, not dangling at the other end of a long 
causal chain. Concentrating on this sort of coupling leads us to an 
active externalism, as opposed to the passive externalism of 
Putnam and Burge.  
 
Many have complained that even if Putnam and Burge are right 
about the externality of content, it is not clear that these external 
aspects play a causal or explanatory role in the generation of 
action. In counterfactual cases where internal structure is held 
constant but these external features are changed, behavior looks 
just the same; so internal structure seems to be doing the crucial 
work. We will not adjudicate that issue here, but we note that 
active externalism is not threatened by any such problem. The 
external features in a coupled system play an ineliminable role - if 
we retain internal structure but change the external features, 
behavior may change completely. The external features here are 
just as causally relevant as typical internal features of the brain.[*]  
 
*[[Much of the appeal of externalism in the philosophy of mind may stem from 
the intuitive appeal of active externalism. Externalists often make analogies 
involving external features in coupled systems, and appeal to the arbitrariness of 
boundaries between brain and environment. But these intuitions sit uneasily with 
the letter of standard externalism. In most of the Putnam/Burge cases, the 
immediate environment is irrelevant; only the historical environment counts. 
Debate has focused on the question of whether mind must be in the head, but a 
more relevant question in assessing these examples might be: is mind in the 
present?]]  
 
By embracing an active externalism, we allow a more natural 
explanation of all sorts of actions. One can explain my choice of 
words in Scrabble, for example, as the outcome of an extended 
cognitive process involving the rearrangement of tiles on my tray. 
Of course, one could always try to explain my action in terms of 
internal processes and a long series of "inputs" and "actions", but 
this explanation would be needlessly complex. If an isomorphic 
process were going on in the head, we would feel no urge to 
characterize it in this cumbersome way.[*] In a very real sense, the 
re-arrangement of tiles on the tray is not part of action; it is part of 
thought.  
 
*[[Herbert Simon (1981) once suggested that we view internal memory as, in 
effect, an external resource upon which "real" inner processes operate. "Search in 
memory," he comments, "is not very different from search of the external 
environment." Simon's view at least has the virtue of treating internal and external 
processing with the parity they deserve, but we suspect that on his view the mind 
will shrink too small for most people's tastes. ]]  
 
The view we advocate here is reflected by a growing body of 
research in cognitive science. In areas as diverse as the theory of 
situated cognition (Suchman 1987), studies of real-world-robotics 
(Beer 1989), dynamical approaches to child development (Thelen 
and Smith 1994), and research on the cognitive properties of 
collectives of agents (Hutchins 1995), cognition is often taken to 
be continuous with processes in the environment.[*] Thus, in 
seeing cognition as extended one is not merely making a 
terminological decision; it makes a significant difference to the 
methodology of scientific investigation. In effect, explanatory 
methods that might once have been thought appropriate only for 
the analysis of "inner" processes are now being adapted for the 
study of the outer, and there is promise that our understanding of 
cognition will become richer for it.  
 
*[[Philosophical views of a similar spirit can be found in Haugeland 1995, 
McClamrock 1985, Varela et al 1991, and Wilson 1994..]]  
 
Some find this sort of externalism unpalatable. One reason may be 
that many identify the cognitive with the conscious, and it seems 
far from plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in 
these cases. But not every cognitive process, at least on standard 
usage, is a conscious process. It is widely accepted that all sorts of 
processes beyond the borders of consciousness play a crucial role 
in cognitive processing: in the retrieval of memories, linguistic 
processes, and skill acquisition, for example. So the mere fact that 
external processes are external where consciousness is internal is 
no reason to deny that those processes are cognitive.  
 
More interestingly, one might argue that what keeps real cognition 
processes in the head is the requirement that cognitive processes be 
portable. Here, we are moved by a vision of what might be called 
the Naked Mind: a package of resources and operations we can 
always bring to bear on a cognitive task, regardless of the local 
environment. On this view, the trouble with coupled systems is that 
they are too easily decoupled. The true cognitive processes are 
those that lie at the constant core of the system; anything else is an 
add-on extra.  
 
There is something to this objection. The brain (or brain and body) 
comprises a package of basic, portable, cognitive resources that is 
of interest in its own right. These resources may incorporate bodily 
actions into cognitive processes, as when we use our fingers as 
working memory in a tricky calculation, but they will not 
encompass the more contingent aspects of our external 
environment, such as a pocket calculator. Still, mere contingency 
of coupling does not rule out cognitive status. In the distant future 
we may be able to plug various modules into our brain to help us 
out: a module for extra short-term memory when we need it, for 
example. When a module is plugged in, the processes involving it 
are just as cognitive as if they had been there all along.[*]  
 
*[[Or consider the following passage from a recent science fiction novel 
(McHugh 1992, p. 213): "I am taken to the system's department where I am 
attuned to the system. All I do is jack in and then a technician instructs the system 
to attune and it does. I jack out and query the time. 10:52. The information pops 
up. Always before I could only access information when I was jacked in, it gave 
me a sense that I knew what I thought and what the system told me, but now, how 
do I know what is system and what is Zhang?"]]  
 
Even if one were to make the portability criterion pivotal, active 
externalism would not be undermined. Counting on our fingers has 
already been let in the door, for example, and it is easy to push 
things further. Think of the old image of the engineer with a slide 
rule hanging from his belt wherever he goes. What if people 
always carried a pocket calculator, or had them implanted? The 
real moral of the portability intuition is that for coupled systems to 
be relevant to the core of cognition, reliable coupling is required. It 
happens that most reliable coupling takes place within the brain, 
but there can easily be reliable coupling with the environment as 
well. If the resources of my calculator or my Filofax are always 
there when I need them, then they are coupled with me as reliably 
as we need. In effect, they are part of the basic package of 
cognitive resources that I bring to bear on the everyday world. 
These systems cannot be impugned simply on the basis of the 
danger of discrete damage, loss, or malfunction, or because of any 
occasional decoupling: the biological brain is in similar danger, 
and occasionally loses capacities temporarily in episodes of sleep, 
intoxication, and emotion. If the relevant capacities are generally 
there when they are required, this is coupling enough.  
 
Moreover, it may be that the biological brain has in fact evolved 
and matured in ways which factor in the reliable presence of a 
manipulable external environment. It certainly seems that 
evolution has favored on-board capacities which are especially 
geared to parasitizing the local environment so as to reduce 
memory load, and even to transform the nature of the 
computational problems themselves. Our visual systems have 
evolved to rely on their environment in various ways: they exploit 
contingent facts about the structure of natural scenes (e.g. Ullman 
and Richards 1984), for example, and they take advantage of the 
computational shortcuts afforded by bodily motion and locomotion 
(e.g. Blake and Yuille, 1992). Perhaps there are other cases where 
evolution has found it advantageous to exploit the possibility of the 
environment being in the cognitive loop. If so, then external 
coupling is part of the truly basic package of cognitive resources 
that we bring to bear on the world.  
 
Language may be an example. Language appears to be a central 
means by which cognitive processes are extended into the world. 
Think of a group of people brainstorming around a table, or a 
philosopher who thinks best by writing, developing her ideas as 
she goes. It may be that language evolved, in part, to enable such 
extensions of our cognitive resources within actively coupled 
systems.  
 
Within the lifetime of an organism, too, individual learning may 
have molded the brain in ways that rely on cognitive extensions 
that surrounded us as we learned. Language is again a central 
example here, as are the various physical and computational 
artifacts that are routinely used as cognitive extensions by children 
in schools and by trainees in numerous professions. In such cases 
the brain develops in a way that complements the external 
structures, and learns to play its role within a unified, densely 
coupled system. Once we recognize the crucial role of the 
environment in constraining the evolution and development of 
cognition, we see that extended cognition is a core cognitive 
process, not an add-on extra.  
 
An analogy may be helpful. The extraordinary efficiency of the 
fish as a swimming device is partly due, it now seems, to an 
evolved capacity to couple its swimming behaviors to the pools of 
external kinetic energy found as swirls, eddies and vortices in its 
watery environment (see Triantafyllou and G. Triantafyllou 1995). 
These vortices include both naturally occurring ones (e.g., where 
water hits a rock) and self-induced ones (created by well-timed tail 
flaps). The fish swims by building these externally occurring 
processes into the very heart of its locomotion routines. The fish 
and surrounding vortices together constitute a unified and 
remarkably efficient swimming machine.  
 
Now consider a reliable feature of the human environment, such as 
the sea of words. This linguistic surround envelopes us from birth. 
Under such conditions, the plastic human brain will surely come to 
treat such structures as a reliable resource to be factored into the 
shaping of on-board cognitive routines. Where the fish flaps its tail 
to set up the eddies and vortices it subsequently exploits, we 
intervene in multiple linguistic media, creating local structures and 
disturbances whose reliable presence drives our ongoing internal 
processes. Words and external symbols are thus paramount among 
the cognitive vortices which help constitute human thought.  
 
 
4 From Cognition to Mind 
 
So far we have spoken largely about "cognitive processing", and 
argued for its extension into the environment. Some might think 
that the conclusion has been bought too cheaply. Perhaps some 
processing takes place in the environment, but what of mind? 
Everything we have said so far is compatible with the view that 
truly mental states - experiences, beliefs, desires, emotions, and so 
on - are all determined by states of the brain. Perhaps what is truly 
mental is internal, after all?  
 
We propose to take things a step further. While some mental states, 
such as experiences, may be determined internally, there are other 
cases in which external factors make a significant contribution. In 
particular, we will argue that beliefs can be constituted partly by 
features of the environment, when those features play the right sort 
of role in driving cognitive processes. If so, the mind extends into 
the world.  
 
First, consider a normal case of belief embedded in memory. Inga 
hears from a friend that there is an exhibition at the Museum of 
Modern Art, and decides to go see it. She thinks for a moment and 
recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd 
Street and goes into the museum. It seems clear that Inga believes 
that the museum is on 53rd Street, and that she believed this even 
before she consulted her memory. It was not previously an 
occurrent belief, but then neither are most of our beliefs. The 
belief was sitting somewhere in memory, waiting to be accessed.  
 
Now consider Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and like 
many Alzheimer's patients, he relies on information in the 
environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook 
around with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new 
information, he writes it down. When he needs some old 
information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role 
usually played by a biological memory. Today, Otto hears about 
the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see 
it. He consults the notebook, which says that the museum is on 
53rd Street, so he walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum.  
 
Clearly, Otto walked to 53rd Street because he wanted to go to the 
museum and he believed the museum was on 53rd Street. And just 
as Inga had her belief even before she consulted her memory, it 
seems reasonable to say that Otto believed the museum was on 
53rd Street even before consulting his notebook. For in relevant 
respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for 
Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in 
the notebook functions just like the information constituting an 
ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information 
lies beyond the skin.  
 
The alternative is to say that Otto has no belief about the matter 
until he consults his notebook; at best, he believes that the museum 
is located at the address in the notebook. But if we follow Otto 
around for a while, we will see how unnatural this way of speaking 
is. Otto is constantly using his notebook as a matter of course. It is 
central to his actions in all sorts of contexts, in the way that an 
ordinary memory is central in an ordinary life. The same 
information might come up again and again, perhaps being slightly 
modified on occasion, before retreating into the recesses of his 
artificial memory. To say that the beliefs disappear when the 
notebook is filed away seems to miss the big picture in just the 
same way as saying that Inga's beliefs disappear as soon as she is 
no longer conscious of them. In both cases the information is 
reliably there when needed, available to consciousness and 
available to guide action, in just the way that we expect a belief to 
be.  
 
Certainly, insofar as beliefs and desires are characterized by their 
explanatory roles, Otto's and Inga's cases seem to be on a par: the 
essential causal dynamics of the two cases mirror each other 
precisely. We are happy to explain Inga's action in terms of her 
occurrent desire to go to the museum and her standing belief that 
the museum is on 53rd street, and we should be happy to explain 
Otto's action in the same way. The alternative is to explain Otto's 
action in terms of his occurrent desire to go to the museum, his 
standing belief that the Museum is on the location written in the 
notebook, and the accessible fact that the notebook says the 
Museum is on 53rd Street; but this complicates the explanation 
unnecessarily. If we must resort to explaining Otto's action this 
way, then we must also do so for the countless other actions in 
which his notebook is involved; in each of the explanations, there 
will be an extra term involving the notebook. We submit that to 
explain things this way is to take one step too many. It is 
pointlessly complex, in the same way that it would be pointlessly 
complex to explain Inga's actions in terms of beliefs about her 
memory. The notebook is a constant for Otto, in the same way that 
memory is a constant for Inga; to point to it in every belief/desire 
explanation would be redundant. In an explanation, simplicity is 
power.  
 
If this is right, we can even construct the case of Twin Otto, who is 
just like Otto except that a while ago he mistakenly wrote in his 
notebook that the Museum of Modern Art was on 51st Street. 
Today, Twin Otto is a physical duplicate of Otto from the skin in, 
but his notebook differs. Consequently, Twin Otto is best 
characterized as believing that the museum is on 51st Street, where 
Otto believes it is on 53rd. In these cases, a belief is simply not in 
the head.  
 
This mirrors the conclusion of Putnam and Burge, but again there 
are important differences. In the Putnam/Burge cases, the external 
features constituting differences in belief are distal and historical, 
so that twins in these cases produce physically indistinguishable 
behavior. In the cases we are describing, the relevant external 
features play an active role in the here-and-now, and have a direct 
impact on behavior. Where Otto walks to 53rd Street, Twin Otto 
walks to 51st. There is no question of explanatory irrelevance for 
this sort of external belief content; it is introduced precisely 
because of the central explanatory role that it plays. Like the 
Putnam and Burge cases, these cases involve differences in 
reference and truth-conditions, but they also involve differences in 
the dynamics of cognition.[*]  
 
*[[In the terminology of Chalmers' "The Components of Content" (forthcoming): 
the twins in the Putnam and Burge cases differ only in their relational content, but 
Otto and his twin can be seen to differ in their notional content, which is the sort 
of content that governs cognition. Notional content is generally internal to a 
cognitive system, but in this case the cognitive system is itself effectively 
extended to include the notebook.]]  
 
The moral is that when it comes to belief, there is nothing sacred 
about skull and skin. What makes some information count as a 
belief is the role it plays, and there is no reason why the relevant 
role can be played only from inside the body.  
 
Some will resist this conclusion. An opponent might put her foot 
down and insist that as she uses the term "belief", or perhaps even 
according to standard usage, Otto simply does not qualify as 
believing that the museum is on 53rd Street. We do not intend to 
debate what is standard usage; our broader point is that the notion 
of belief ought to be used so that Otto qualifies as having the belief 
in question. In all important respects, Otto's case is similar to a 
standard case of (non-occurrent) belief. The differences between 
Otto's case and Inga's are striking, but they are superficial. By 
using the "belief" notion in a wider way, it picks out something 
more akin to a natural kind. The notion becomes deeper and more 
unified, and is more useful in explanation.  
 
To provide substantial resistance, an opponent has to show that 
Otto's and Inga's cases differ in some important and relevant 
respect. But in what deep respect are the cases different? To make 
the case solely on the grounds that information is in the head in one 
case but not in the other would be to beg the question. If this 
difference is relevant to a difference in belief, it is surely not 
primitively relevant. To justify the different treatment, we must 
find some more basic underlying difference between the two.  
 
It might be suggested that the cases are relevantly different in that 
Inga has more reliable access to the information. After all, 
someone might take away Otto's notebook at any time, but Inga's 
memory is safer. It is not implausible that constancy is relevant: 
indeed, the fact that Otto always uses his notebook played some 
role in our justifying its cognitive status. If Otto were consulting a 
guidebook as a one-off, we would be much less likely to ascribe 
him a standing belief. But in the original case, Otto's access to the 
notebook is very reliable - not perfectly reliable, to be sure, but 
then neither is Inga's access to her memory. A surgeon might 
tamper with her brain, or more mundanely, she might have too 
much to drink. The mere possibility of such tampering is not 
enough to deny her the belief.  
 
One might worry that Otto's access to his notebook in fact comes 
and goes. He showers without the notebook, for example, and he 
cannot read it when it is dark. Surely his belief cannot come and go 
so easily? We could get around this problem by redescribing the 
situation, but in any case an occasional temporary disconnection 
does not threaten our claim. After all, when Inga is asleep, or when 
she is intoxicated, we do not say that her belief disappears. What 
really counts is that the information is easily available when the 
subject needs it, and this constraint is satisfied equally in the two 
cases. If Otto's notebook were often unavailable to him at times 
when the information in it would be useful, there might be a 
problem, as the information would not be able to play the action-
guiding role that is central to belief; but if it is easily available in 
most relevant situations, the belief is not endangered.  
 
Perhaps a difference is that Inga has better access to the 
information than Otto does? Inga's "central" processes and her 
memory probably have a relatively high-bandwidth link between 
them, compared to the low-grade connection between Otto and his 
notebook. But this alone does not make a difference between 
believing and not believing. Consider Inga's museum-going friend 
Lucy, whose biological memory has only a low-grade link to her 
central systems, due to nonstandard biology or past misadventures. 
Processing in Lucy's case might be less efficient, but as long as the 
relevant information is accessible, Lucy clearly believes that the 
museum is on 53rd Street. If the connection was too indirect - if 
Lucy had to struggle hard to retrieve the information with mixed 
results, or a psychotherapist's aid were needed - we might become 
more reluctant to ascribe the belief, but such cases are well beyond 
Otto's situation, in which the information is easily accessible.  
 
Another suggestion could be that Otto has access to the relevant 
information only by perception, whereas Inga has more direct 
access -- by introspection, perhaps. In some ways, however, to put 
things this way is to beg the question. After all, we are in effect 
advocating a point of view on which Otto's internal processes and 
his notebook constitute a single cognitive system. From the 
standpoint of this system, the flow of information between 
notebook and brain is not perceptual at all; it does not involve the 
impact of something outside the system. It is more akin to 
information flow within the brain. The only deep way in which the 
access is perceptual is that in Otto's case, there is a distinctly 
perceptual phenomenology associated with the retrieval of the 
information, whereas in Inga's case there is not. But why should 
the nature of an associated phenomenology make a difference to 
the status of a belief? Inga's memory may have some associated 
phenomenology, but it is still a belief. The phenomenology is not 
visual, to be sure. But for visual phenomenology consider the 
Terminator, from the Arnold Schwarzenegger movie of the same 
name. When he recalls some information from memory, it is 
"displayed" before him in his visual field (presumably he is 
conscious of it, as there are frequent shots depicting his point of 
view). The fact that standing memories are recalled in this unusual 
way surely makes little difference to their status as standing 
beliefs.  
 
These various small differences between Otto's and Inga's cases are 
all shallow differences. To focus on them would be to miss the 
way in which for Otto, notebook entries play just the sort of role 
that beliefs play in guiding most people's lives.  
 
Perhaps the intuition that Otto's is not a true belief comes from a 
residual feeling that the only true beliefs are occurrent beliefs. If 
we take this feeling seriously, Inga's belief will be ruled out too, as 
will many beliefs that we attribute in everyday life. This would be 
an extreme view, but it may be the most consistent way to deny 
Otto's belief. Upon even a slightly less extreme view - the view 
that a belief must be available for consciousness, for example - 
Otto's notebook entry seems to qualify just as well as Inga's 
memory. Once dispositional beliefs are let in the door, it is difficult 




5 Beyond the Outer Limits 
 
If the thesis is accepted, how far should we go? All sorts of puzzle 
cases spring to mind. What of the amnesic villagers in 100 Years of 
Solitude, who forget the names for everything and so hang labels 
everywhere? Does the information in my Filofax count as part of 
my memory? If Otto's notebook has been tampered with, does he 
believe the newly-installed information? Do I believe the contents 
of the page in front of me before I read it? Is my cognitive state 
somehow spread across the Internet?  
 
We do not think that there are categorical answers to all of these 
questions, and we will not give them. But to help understand what 
is involved in ascriptions of extended belief, we can at least 
examine the features of our central case that make the notion so 
clearly applicable there. First, the notebook is a constant in Otto's 
life - in cases where the information in the notebook would be 
relevant, he will rarely take action without consulting it. Second, 
the information in the notebook is directly available without 
difficulty. Third, upon retrieving information from the notebook he 
automatically endorses it. Fourth, the information in the notebook 
has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past, and 
indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement.[*] The status 
of the fourth feature as a criterion for belief is arguable (perhaps 
one can acquire beliefs through subliminal perception, or through 
memory tampering?), but the first three features certainly play a 
crucial role.  
 
*[[The constancy and past-endorsement criteria may suggest that history is partly 
constitutive of belief. One might react to this by removing any historical 
component (giving a purely dispositional reading of the constancy criterion and 
eliminating the past-endorsement criterion, for example), or one might allow such 
a component as long as the main burden is carried by features of the present.]]  
 
Insofar as increasingly exotic puzzle cases lack these features, the 
applicability of the notion of "belief" gradually falls off. If I rarely 
take relevant action without consulting my Filofax, for example, its 
status within my cognitive system will resemble that of the 
notebook in Otto's. But if I often act without consultation - for 
example, if I sometimes answer relevant questions with "I don't 
know" - then information in it counts less clearly as part of my 
belief system. The Internet is likely to fail on multiple counts, 
unless I am unusually computer-reliant, facile with the technology, 
and trusting, but information in certain files on my computer may 
qualify. In intermediate cases, the question of whether a belief is 
present may be indeterminate, or the answer may depend on the 
varying standards that are at play in various contexts in which the 
question might be asked. But any indeterminacy here does not 
mean that in the central cases, the answer is not clear.  
 
What about socially extended cognition? Could my mental states 
be partly constituted by the states of other thinkers? We see no 
reason why not, in principle. In an unusually interdependent 
couple, it is entirely possible that one partner's beliefs will play the 
same sort of role for the other as the notebook plays for Otto.[*] 
What is central is a high degree of trust, reliance, and accessibility. 
In other social relationships these criteria may not be so clearly 
fulfilled, but they might nevertheless be fulfilled in specific 
domains. For example, the waiter at my favorite restaurant might 
act as a repository of my beliefs about my favorite meals (this 
might even be construed as a case of extended desire). In other 
cases, one's beliefs might be embodied in one's secretary, one's 
accountant, or one's collaborator.[*]  
 
*[[From the New York Times, March 30, 1995, p.B7, in an article on former 
UCLA basketball coach John Wooden: "Wooden and his wife attended 36 straight 
Final Fours, and she invariably served as his memory bank. Nell Wooden rarely 
forgot a name - her husband rarely remembered one - and in the standing-room-
only Final Four lobbies, she would recognize people for him."]]  
 
*[[Might this sort of reasoning also allow something like Burge's extended 
"arthritis" beliefs? After all, I might always defer to my doctor in taking relevant 
actions concerning my disease. Perhaps so, but there are some clear differences. 
For example, any extended beliefs would be grounded in an existing active 
relationship with the doctor, rather than in a historical relationship to a language 
community. And on the current analysis, my deference to the doctor would tend to 
yield something like a true belief that I have some other disease in my thigh, rather 
than the false belief that I have arthritis there. On the other hand, if I used medical 
experts solely as terminological consultants, the results of Burge's analysis might 
be mirrored.]]  
 
In each of these cases, the major burden of the coupling between 
agents is carried by language. Without language, we might be 
much more akin to discrete Cartesian "inner" minds, in which 
high-level cognition relies largely on internal resources. But the 
advent of language has allowed us to spread this burden into the 
world. Language, thus construed, is not a mirror of our inner states 
but a complement to them. It serves as a tool whose role is to 
extend cognition in ways that on-board devices cannot. Indeed, it 
may be that the intellectual explosion in recent evolutionary time is 
due as much to this linguistically-enabled extension of cognition as 
to any independent development in our inner cognitive resources.  
 
What, finally, of the self? Does the extended mind imply an 
extended self? It seems so. Most of us already accept that the self 
outstrips the boundaries of consciousness; my dispositional beliefs, 
for example, constitute in some deep sense part of who I am. If so, 
then these boundaries may also fall beyond the skin. The 
information in Otto's notebook, for example, is a central part of his 
identity as a cognitive agent. What this comes to is that Otto 
himself is best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of 
biological organism and external resources. To consistently resist 
this conclusion, we would have to shrink the self into a mere 
bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening its deep 
psychological continuity. Far better to take the broader view, and 
see agents themselves as spread into the world.  
 
As with any reconception of ourselves, this view will have 
significant consequences. There are obvious consequences for 
philosophical views of the mind and for the methodology of 
research in cognitive science, but there will also be effects in the 
moral and social domains. It may be, for example, that in some 
cases interfering with someone's environment will have the same 
moral significance as interfering with their person. And if the view 
is taken seriously, certain forms of social activity might be 
reconceived as less akin to communication and action, and as more 
akin to thought. In any case, once the hegemony of skin and skull 
is usurped, we may be able to see ourselves more truly as creatures 
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